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Assessing the Threat from
Terrorism in the Caribbean

Anthony Clayton, University of the West Indies

Abstract
Gangs can serve as a “force multiplier” for terrorism;
they are a source of recruits, weapons, and local
knowledge. Terrorist organizations such as Daesh/ISIS
are now skilled at recruiting disaffected youth, many
with prior criminal records. Any country with significant numbers of gang members with the potential to
be radicalized may therefore be a potential recruiting
ground for fundamentalists. Several countries in the
Caribbean appear particularly vulnerable, including
Trinidad and Tobago, which has already suffered one
attempted coup by jihadists, and Jamaica, which has
nearly 300 violent gangs and many disadvantaged
young men. There is a clear pattern of jihadist attacks
on tourists, and the Caribbean is one of the world’s
leading tourism destinations, so tourists may be the
primary targets rather than Caribbean nationals.

The Caribbean
Eight of the ten most violent countries in the world
are in Central America and the Caribbean.1 These
exceptionally high homicide rates are the result of
interlocking factors, including powerful criminal
networks, weak and compromised governments, corruption, and the profits to be made from trafficking
narcotics, weapons and people, extortion, and other
criminal enterprises. The violence deters investment
and spurs migration, which perpetuates the underlying social and economic problems, resulting in a large
number of poorly-educated, disaffected, and marginalized youth who see violence as the way to wealth
and power.

Recent Trends in Terrorism
Recent terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015
and in Brussels on March 22, 2016 highlighted that
the largest source of foreign recruits to international jihadist networks are disaffected young men with
prior criminal convictions. From 2001 to 2009, (i.e. before the rise of Daesh) about 25 percent of the known
jihadists in Europe had criminal records; mainly for
narcotics, car theft, and weapons trafficking. In Belgium, by August 2015, this had risen to about 50 per-

cent of the known jihadists.2 This suggests that Daesh
is particularly skillful at recruiting criminals and gang
members, who typically radicalize within a small network of friends.3 These recruits are often motivated
by excitement, power, and a sense of belonging; very
few are pious. It is therefore likely that a country with
high levels of violence and a large number of disaffected, unemployed youth will now be seen by terrorist organizations as a potential recruiting ground.
Daesh claimed responsibility for the Paris attacks
of November 2015 and called them the “First of the
Storm.” It is clear that Daesh no longer confines its operations to Syria, Iraq, and adjacent states, but now
aspires to a much wider conflict. Daesh operates with
delegated authority; the Caliphate provides guidance, training, and funding, but the time, place, and
manner of the attack is determined by local affiliates.
This appears to have been the model followed in recent attacks in Paris, Beirut, and the October 2015
bombing of a Metrojet Flight from Sharm el-Sheikh
that killed 224 people.
The nature of the threat has evolved significantly
since 2001, and the terrorist attacks in Paris reflect
a rapid recent reordering of terrorist structures, alliances, priorities, and capabilities. The threat is now
exceptionally fluid and complex, and very difficult to
pattern or predict, because the enemy is no longer
a single entity. Daesh is simultaneously an organization, a self-proclaimed state, the core of a network of
affiliated organizations and sympathetic individuals,
a religious and political belief system, and a malignant ideology that is being disseminated around the
world on a multiplicity of media and social channels.
The current surge in terrorism is the result of a number of deep and almost intractable problems, including the conflict between the Sunni and Shia faiths,
the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the disbanding of the
Iraqi army (many former Baathist soldiers are now
with Daesh), Saudi Arabia’s support for Wahhabi (fundamentalist) Sunni imams, the complex, multi-sided
war in Syria, and a large number of local conflicts and
grievances, many of which now find common cause
and expression through Daesh. None of these problems are likely to be resolved in the foreseeable future, and many of them are metastasizing, moving
into new territories (especially ungovernable provinces and weak states), and evolving into new forms
(such as cyberspace). This means that the associated terrorism is likely to persist for decades to come.
Daesh is currently the most prominent and advanced
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incarnation of these problems. Even if Daesh could
be destroyed, the problems would persist and give
rise to some new organization. A permanent solution
would require resolutions to many issues, including
questions of borders, ethnicity, identity, governance,
faith, economic development, access to land, water
and other resources, climate change, and other environmental impacts. None of these are easy, and there
is no comprehensive solution in sight.

equipment to compete with Daesh.6
The Paris and Brussels attacks represent a major escalation of Daesh’s global campaign. Their publications
were exultant, and they have promised more such attacks around the world. Many potential recruits will
be motivated by these exceptionally high-impact,
high-visibility attacks.
The main recruiting channels for Daesh are existing networks of disaffected youth accessed via
prisons, charismatic preachers, leaders, and other
opinion-formers. Daesh is also highly skilled at psychological manipulation on social media. Their media
presence and ability to control the narrative are technically competent and skillful. Individual Daesh “mentors” will spend hundreds of hours patiently grooming valuable potential recruits over the Internet. They
reach out to troubled and/or disaffected youth, with a
message of glamor, violence, and comradeship. They
offer a simple, uncompromising, radical, and compelling vision to those who find life difficult and confusing, to those who do not feel that they have the life
that they want, to those that feel that they are not given the “respect” they deserve, and to those who feel
that they want to be more than a loser or low-level
gang member. Their method is essentially the same
as that used by every totalitarian movement; to set
life’s petty miseries in a grand historical context, to
blame another group for these problems, and to extol the use of violence against that group. In this way,
disaffected youth can feel that they are part of a great
movement to reclaim their rightful place in the world.

The key target audience for Daesh ideology consists
of troubled and disaffected youth. Many of those
who have been recruited in Western countries to kill
for Daesh were not particularly religious; some were
only recent converts to Islam. For example, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the “mastermind” of the Paris attacks
on November 13th, was a student at a Catholic school,
and did not attend a mosque. He became involved in
petty crime before travelling to Syria in 2014.4 His actions appear to have been motivated by a desire for
power, violence, and unaccountability, rather than religion. Similarly, Salah Abdeslam and his elder brother
Ibrahim, a suicide bomber in the Paris attacks, used
to run a cafe in Molenbeek that sold alcohol and was
closed down for drug offenses. Their network of support was based on personal loyalty, disenchantment,
and petty crime, rather than radical ideology. Khalid
and Ibrahim el-Bakraoui, the suicide bombers who
carried out the attacks in Brussels on March 22, 2016,
had multiple prior convictions. Khalid was sentenced
in 2011 to five years for criminal conspiracy, armed
robbery, possession of stolen cars, and weapons; Ibrahim was sentenced in 2010 to nine years in prison for
attempted murder (both were paroled).5
The extraordinary and rapid success of Daesh reflects
This is a common pattern; many recent recruits have its ability to appeal to the disaffected with a compela history of personal or psychological problems, pet- ling narrative and to sell this with exceptional skill.
ty crime and gang membership, and a sense of alien- European jihadists come from a range of socio-ecoation. Daesh offers these people a very powerful mes- nomic backgrounds and areas, and from both immisage of glamor, violence and a sense of belonging to grant and native backgrounds; but the largest group
a great cause. Any country with a large number of consists of young men with criminal records from
troubled and/or disaffected youth is therefore a fer- urban areas, 7some of whom also have prior mental
health issues.
tile potential recruiting ground.

In 2006, the average age of European jihadists (at the
time of their arrest) was 27.3, with the youngest aged
16 years old.8 The average age may now be slightly
Daesh originated as an affiliate of Al-Qaeda but has lower, as a result of an increase in the number of very
now largely supplanted them. Daesh claims to be the young recruits, some just 15, so a typical jihadi forsole legitimate jihadi organization active today (this is eign fighter is now a male between 18 and 29 years
a part of their image and recruiting strategy); Al-Qae- old.9 The average speed of radicalization appears to
da is still a significant threat, but no longer has the have accelerated, with the process generally taking
image, momentum, recruits, operatives, financing, or weeks rather than months, and there is increasing

Daesh: The Social Media Generation
Terrorists
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evidence that jihadist recruitment tends to spread
through previously-established networks (communities, families, mosques, and gangs), where groups of
acquaintances already identify with each other.10 Given that recent immigrants may be easier to track, the
main threat in most European countries is now from
young, home-grown terrorists, typically radicalized
through contact with others or, in some cases, via social media, who are usually “off the radar” until they
commit their first serious action.

The Threat to Caribbean Nations
In 2015, U.S. Southern Command said that about 100
Caribbean nationals had travelled to Syria to train
with Daesh.11 In addition, a total of 337, 802 nationals
from terrorist-linked countries (Afghanistan, Algeria,
Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria,
Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen) transited Caribbean nations over the period 2007-2014, indicating the ease
with which jihadists could enter the Caribbean. The
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is probably the most
exposed to risk, partly because some eight to nine
percent of the population are Muslims; most of them
are moderates, but they also have the fundamentalist
group Jamaat al-Muslimeen, led by Yasin Abu Bakr,
which attempted a coup on July 27, 1990, seized the
parliament building, the main TV and radio stations,
and killed 24 people.12
Jamaica is less obviously exposed to terrorist recruitment than Trinidad and Tobago, but has even higher
levels of violent crime, with a homicide rate that is
currently sixth in the world. This is the result of a complex set of interlocking problems; Jamaica’s National
Security Policy notes that the Tier 1 threats to the nation include “transnational organized crime, including trafficking in narcotics, weapons, ammunition,
money and people, money laundering and cybercrime…gangs and domestic organized crime…contract killing, intimidation and extortion, kidnapping,
dealing in narcotics and illegal weapons and money
laundering…a political system that is still compromised by links to organized crime…corruption in key
institutions of state, including the security forces, police, prison and justice systems, and gang-dominated
communities.”13
As this suggests, Jamaica has deeper social, political,
and economic problems than the marginalized communities in Paris and Brussels. Jamaica is also home
to Abdullah el-Faisal (born Trevor William Forrest in

1963). He was raised as a Christian, but converted to
Islam at the age of 16, studied in Saudi Arabia, and
moved to the UK to preach during the 1980s. He appears to have been effective in radicalizing others; his
congregation included “shoe bomber” Richard Reid,
9/11 plot member Zacarias Moussaoui, and Muhammad Sidique Khan and Germaine Lindsay, suicide
bombers in the July 7th London attack in 2005. He was
convicted in the UK in 2002 on five charges of soliciting murder, served four years and was deported to
Jamaica in 2007.

Potential Target: Tourists in The
Caribbean
A single point of contact in any Caribbean island
could be the nucleus of a devastating terrorist incident. Recent terrorist incidents have involved small
numbers, typically from one to ten individuals, who
can inflict serious harm in a single or coordinated set
of attacks. There is a low level of awareness in the Caribbean of the potential threat from terrorism, but a
number of recent attacks have focused specifically on
tourist and leisure areas. For example:
In 1997, members of al-Gama’a al-Islamiya
killed 58 tourists at Luxor. Egypt’s tourism earnings fell that year by $1.17 billion, about 25
percent of Egypt’s revenue from the industry.
In 2002, members of Jemaah Islamiyah
bombed a nightclub in Bali, killing 201 tourists.
The event was planned to maximize civilian
casualties.14 The nightclub was known to cater
largely to tourists, and was targeted as a result;
members of Jemaah Islamiyah stated in court
that their goal was to cripple the tourism industry. Bali’s visitor arrivals fell that year by 22
percent; some 300,000 jobs were lost.
On September 21, 2013, al-Shabaab militants
based in Somalia attacked the Westgate shopping center in Nairobi, Kenya, and killed 68
people. The shopping center catered mainly to
the middle-class, UN workers, and tourists.
On January 7, 2015, members of Al-Qaeda
in Yemen attacked the offices of the satirical
weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo and a kosher
market in Paris. They killed a total of 17 people
and injured 22. Over the following nine days
France’s revenues from tourism fell by 25 percent and then fell by another 26 percent over
the subsequent 10 days. Occupancy rates in
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Paris hotels fell by about three percent, but
reservations for restaurants and bars experienced a cancellation rate of 68 percent, which
suggests that people were not cancelling visits
to Paris, but were far more reluctant to go out
into public spaces.15

in the country is directly or indirectly related to tourism. Any terrorist incident that damages confidence
in Jamaica’s tourism industry would therefore have
immediate and widespread consequences to the nation—even if Jamaica was only the chosen location
for the attack.19 The deliberate sinking of a cruise ship,
for example, could result in over twice as many fatalities as the 9/11 incident, in which some 3,000 people died, as a large modern cruise ship can carry over
6,000 passengers and over 2,000 crew members. Any
such incident would probably have a long-term impact on the world cruise industry, which would affect
the Caribbean more than any other region, as the Caribbean currently accounts for over half of the world
market share of cruise ship destinations.20

On November 13, 2015, a series of coordinated
terrorist attacks in Paris killed 130 people and
368 people were injured, some 80-100 seriously. The venues attacked were all social hubs,
including a music venue and a restaurant. The
occupancy rate at Paris hotels fell 21 percent
on the Saturday following the attacks and 23
percent the next day, far more than the three
percent fall after the Charlie Hebdo attack,
which suggests that the cumulative impact of The tourism industry does demonstrate remarkable
two terrorist incidents had a far bigger impact resilience, and eventually recovers. After a major terrorist incident, however, tourism volumes typically
on tourist arrivals.16
fall by 25-75 percent and do not recover for some
On June 26, 2015, Islamists attacked the tourist
years, while the countries affected also have to invest
resort at Port El Kantaoui in Tunisia. They killed
in additional security, spend heavily on advertising,
38 people, 30 of whom were UK nationals.
and offer steep discounts in order to rebuild their
The bomb that destroyed Metrojet Flight 9268 customer base. During that time, a number of the relover the Sinai on October 31, 2015 and killed atively fragile tourism-dependent Caribbean econoall 224 people on board was probably placed mies could collapse.
on the aircraft at Sharm el-Sheikh. As a result, Conclusion
a number of countries advised against travel
to that area. Egypt’s tourism receipts fell by Several Caribbean nations have a number of attrialmost 50 percent, and many of the hotels in butes that make them potentially fertile ground for
terrorist networks, including:
Sharm el-Sheikh closed.
Jamaica’s tourism industry has already suffered as a
result of terrorism. After 9/11, global tourism volumes
fell by 10 percent. Visitor arrivals to some countries fell
by 30 percent, Caribbean arrivals fell by 15 percent,
and Jamaica’s arrivals declined by 20 percent. Many
Caribbean destinations had to discount heavily to try
to maintain room occupancy, and found it difficult to
revert to their former prices for years afterwards.17 In
spite of this, a survey of the tourism industry in Jamaica carried out in 2011 found that senior operatives in
the industry did not think that Jamaica was at serious
risk of terrorism because “we’re not quarrelling with
anyone.”18 If, however, the intended targets are U.S.
or European citizens, Jamaica might be chosen as the
scene of the attack, rather than the primary target (as
with the Bali nightclub bombing).

A large number of disaffected, disadvantaged
youth with very poor prospects.

Jamaica’s tourism industry now attracts over 3 million
arrivals. The industry generates some 13 percent of
Jamaica’s GDP; and 30-40 percent of all employment

A small but growing number of Caribbean
nationals who have travelled to Syria.

Serious corruption among public officials,
political patronage, and a democratic system
compromised by links with organized crime,
which fosters cynicism and despair of the prospects of legitimate change.
A large number of criminal gangs.
Availability of illegal weapons.
Existing fundamentalists, with contacts with
jihadists.
Extensive in-bound travel from nations with
active terrorist networks.

A large number of soft targets, such as tour
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ism resorts and cruise ships, catering predominantly to North American and European nations, where it would be relatively easy to
mount a “spectacular” attack resulting in a
large number of fatalities.

vestment. This must be accompanied by steps to end
the political culture of corruption and patronage, so
that people can trust their governments, and by reforms to the dysfunctional legal systems so that the
people can have faith in law, order, and justice. This
combination of measures represents the best way to
The nations of the Caribbean are predominantly
‘inorculate’ a population against the spread of viruChristian, but this is unlikely to provide protection,
lent and malignant ideologies.
as many recruits in other countries were only recent
converts to Islam. All the information presented here
is in the public domain, and therefore accessible to
terrorist organizations. It is therefore likely that terrorist organizations will come to the same conclusions, if
they have not already done so.

Recommendations
There are a few key steps that would help to increase
the resilience and preparedness of the Caribbean
nations. The first line of defense, as always, is to be
better informed. Thus, it is important to establish the
protocols and mechanisms for faster and deeper intelligence-sharing and cooperation both within the
Caribbean and with key partners overseas. This in turn
will require the better management of bilateral and
multilateral partnerships towards joint security goals,
and the removal of internal silos (Jamaica has already
integrated the counter-terrorism and organized
crime branches of the Jamaican Constabulary Force).
More effective immigration and border security can
start simply by training staff. More serious investment
would be required in order to improve the security
of transport and shipping infrastructure, especially
as most of the Caribbean nations have highly permeable marine borders. However, new technologies (e.g.
as fixed-wing drones) are increasingly affordable, and
would give a significant increase in regional air and
maritime domain awareness. Regional resource-pooling would rapidly enhance rapid response and search
and rescue capability, and address some of the most
significant resource and capability gaps in regional
defense and security systems.
The most important step, however, is to resolve the
deep social and economic problems in the Caribbean
that create pools of disaffected youth that can then
be recruited by either criminal or terrorist networks.
A combination of better-targeted policing and social
interventions will be required; the normalization and
reintegration of the high-crime, gang-dominated
communities and informal settlements will require a
transition to intelligence-led proximity and community policing supported by both social and private inGlobal Security Review | 25
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